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Abstract:

This paper investigates the economic determinants of
restatements, focusing on companies that were the object of an
SEC Enforcement Action. A sample of 30 restatement firms is
matched with 30 non-restatementfirms in the same industry and
same business and with a similar size as measured by assets. It
was found that the use ofa Big 5 auditfirm reduces the incidence
of restatement. More specifically, use ofErnst & Young as a Big
5 audit firm significantly reduces the possibility of restatement.
Variables testing debt to equity ratio, proportion ofmanagement
ownership and proportion of blockholder ownership as
determinants of restatement were not significant with this
particular sample. Because ofthe strong increase in the number
of restatements in recent years, it is important for a company to
reduce the potential probability of restatement of its financial
statements. This can be done through the utilization of a Big 5
audit firm.

Introduction:
When viewing a set of financial statements, many would
assume that the statements truthfully represent financial results
for the company and that these results are free from fraudulent
information. This conclusion is partially due to the fact that
statements are analyzed by investors, analysts, and competitors
who use the information contained in financial statements to
make decisions about the company. In recent years, it appears
that the assumption of truth may not be completely true,judging
from accounting scandals that have dominated popular press
headlines for several years. We have learned from these scandals
that fmancial statements for many companies contained fraudulent
information which was used by analysts and investors to make
judgments about the future profitability of those firms. By the
time fraudulent information was discovered the information
backing their decisions was misleading, many investments had
already lost a substantial portion of their previous value.
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After a portion of the information in financial statements is
determined to be incorrect, the company must correct the
information and file a restatement with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC). Restatements include financial
statements that were subject to changes in GAAP (such as the
switch from FIFO to LIFO inventory methods), subsequent
events (such as stock splits, mergers, and divestures), and true
fraudulent reporting, in which information is materially
misrepresented. When fraudulent actions are suspected, the
SEC often conducts an investigation into the matter and may
issue an Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Action, often
called an Enforcement Action. This document outlines the
fraudulent actions, providing background about the company,
the amount of restatement, and nature of restatement, and any
future actions taken against the company or its management. In
essence, an Enforcement Action publicly identifies the company
that participated in fraudulent wrongdoing.
This paper investigates the economic determinants of
restatements. It will focus only on companies who have restated
earnings and have been the target of an Enforcement Action.
This will highlight companies that have had fraudulent actions,
rather than other less serious causes of restatements. To discern
whether an accounting action is actually an economic determinant
of restatement, all restatement firms are matched (a control
group) with an equivalent non-restatement firm. The potential
economic determinants between restatement and non-restatement
companies will be measured using the leverage, proportion of
management ownership, and proportion of blockholder
ownership.
After analyzing a sample of 30 restatement companies and
their matched non-restatement companies, it wa~ determined
that those firms audited by Big 5 firms were less likely to produce
a restatement. In a second regression analysis, Ernst & Young
was found to be the Big 5 firm whose clients were least likely to
have a restatement. Variables used to test other hypotheses were
not significant in this test possibly because of the limited sample
available.
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The remainder of the paper will be organized as follows.
Section II discusses relevant background information about the
occurrence of restatements. Section III reviews previous findings
of studies that have discussed restatements. Section IV defines
the sample and data collection methods. Section V discusses
results of analysis of the relationship between restatement and
non-restatement companies, and Section VI provides final
conclusions.

Background Information:
To understand the importance of restatements, one high
profile example is the case ofEnron. When Enron' s restatement
reduced net income by $569 million forthe years ended December
3 l, 1999-2000 and the first two quarters of 200 l, the restatement
was not just a change in numbers for a few accounts (Akhigbe,
Kudla, & Madura, 2005). It also brought a series of changes that
have had long lasting effects on overall investor confidence.
Investors found it difficult to trust the accuracy and reliability of
other companies when their Enron stock had lost nearly all of its
value in a period of days. If a fraud as significant as that ofEnron
could occur within the sight of auditors, then investors may begin
to wonder about the dependability of information provided by
other public companies.

Number of Restatements by Year
414

2000

2001

2002

2003
2004
Source: Huron Consulting Group

The incidence of restatements has become much more
common since the year 2000, with a 22% increase from 20002004 according to data collected by the Huron Consulting
Group. The data also shows a 28% increase in restatements
between 2003 and 2004. Jeff Szafran, managing director of
Huron Consulting, suggests that this increase might be attributed
to the "unprecedented level of regulatory and~ audit scrutiny
d~;en primarily by the Sarbanes-O:dey Act of 2002"' (Bryan:
Lthen, Rul~d, & Sinnett, 2005). Among its many provisions,
the ac~ reqmres CEOs and CFOs to certify the accuracy of
financtal statements, including a certification of internal controls
estab.li.shes an i~dependent audit committee, and provide~
condtu.ons of a~~ttor independence. Szafran also points out the
followmg condttlons regarding the increase in restatements:
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Public companies spent significant amounts of time
and money to comply with the requirements of
Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404, and may have found
some mistakes in the process. (This section requires
that management attest to responsibili i y and accuracy
of internal controls.)
The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
(PCAOB) began reviewing the audit practices of the
major accounting firms.
The SEC budget jumped to almost twice what it was
during 2001, and it used that budget to hire more
professionals to enforce the law.
The SEC established a new Office of Risk Assessment
to look into the practices of certain industries.
Auditors were doing more work, including testing
companies' internal controls. (Bryan et. al., 2005)
It is important to also note that the increase in earnings
restatements has spiked within the last six to eight years and still
reflects a small percentage of overall filings. A study by the FEI
Research Foundation reviewed the incidence of earning
restatements with a sample of 1080 restatements between 1977
and 2000. It found that the average number of restatements
between 1977 and 2000 was only 49, with a large spike between
1998 and 2000 (Moriarty & Livingston, 200 I). More importantly,
the study found that the average number of restatements since
1995 represented 0.67% of the average number of reporting
companies (Morairty & Livingston, 2001). This would suggest
that, while earnings restatements are significant events in the life
of a company, the overall quality of financial statements still
remains high.
A 2004 General Accounting Office study supports Szafran's
analysis of conditions that led to an increase in restatements. It
says about half of companies found their own mistakes, while
external auditors found 2.5% of mistakes and other external
parties found 9% of mistakes (Wallace, 2005). Another 4.5%
were discovered by the SEC, the type of case that will be
analyzed in this paper (Wallace, 2005). This breakdown shows
that companies are usually forthcoming when they discover an
error and may be the best defense against incorrect accounting
practices.
The Huron Consulting report also discloses further trends
in restatements. It found that of the 414 restatements in 2004,
253 (61%) restated annual reports, which are audited by external
auditors (Bryan et. al., 2005). They also discovered that almost
40% of restated annual reports were multiple year restatements,
signaling "flawed accounting policies" and long-standing errors
instead of one time errors (Bryan, et. al., 2005).
Overall, the size and number of restatements appears to be
increasing even with the negative repercussions experienced by
the company following a restatement. Most mistakes that cause
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restatements are found by the company itself and are likely to
cover multiple years. Even with the overall increase in the
numbers of restatements, less than I% of companies file a
restatement in a year, demonstrating the significance of a
restatement in the life of a company

Previous Findings:
The majority of prior literature discusses effects of
restatements on the stock market. These studies overwhelmingly
conclude that earnings restatements produced negative stock
returns. In a sample of firms that restated earnings between 1976
and 1985, William Kinney and Linda McDaniel found that on
average stocks earned negative returns between the release of
false financial statements and the release of the correction
(Kinney & McDaniel, 1989). The amount of negative return was
quantified by Palmrose, Richardson, and Scholz. They found
that the mean abnormal return from a sample of 403 restatements
from 1995-1999 was -9.2% over a two day announcement period
(Palmrose, Richardson, & Scholz, 2004 ). They further concluded
that the average stock price change was even larger than -9.2%
when restatements included an indication of management fraud,
had large material dollar effects, and were initiated by auditors
rather than the company itself.
Anderson and Yohn examined whether different causes of
a restatement have larger effects on stock price changes. They
found a larger negative reaction to revenue recognition
restatements than other type of restatements (Anderson and
Yohn, 2002). This demonstrates that revenue recognition affects
investors' view of"firm value and information asymmetries"
more than other types of restatements (Anderson and Yohn,
2002).
Most previous research centered on stock market effects
from all types of shareholders. Hribar, Jenkins, and Wang,
however, focused on institutional shareholders. This type of
shareholder usually represents a blockholder (owns more than
5% of all shares outstanding), a group that will be examined
further in this paper. The study provided three key conclusions
about institutional shareholders. First, transient institutions,
those focused on the short-term, predict earnings restatements
one quarter prior to actual restatement, providing evidence that
they have an information advantage over regular shareholders
(Hribar, Jenkins, and Wang, 2004). This would be an important
distinction to draw as this paper examines the relationship
between blockholders and restatement companies. Next, the
study found that institutional shareholders respond more
negatively than other investors to the announcement of a
restatement, having different interpretations of both the sign and
weight of the restatement (Hribar et. al., 2004 ). Lastly, institutional
holders are found to trade earlier than individual investors, who
usually trade over a five day window around restatements
(Hribar, et. al., 2004). Overall, the results of this study illustrate
the importance of institutional shareholders to the market as a
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whole because this type of shareholder can have an information
advantage and is likely to respond sooner and more negatively
than the typical shareholder.
Overall, prior research confirms that restatements generally
cause the stock price of a firm to decline following a restatement.
usually around 9%. Also, institutional shareholders have
additional information backing their decisions, allowing them to
make decisions earlier and more drastically than the~average
shareholder.

Hypothesis Developme11t
This paper is designed to test for the effect
of economic determinants of restatements on
financial statements. To do this, three groups that
would have interest in seeing the best results for the
company are examined. These are the debt holders,
management, and institutional shareholders or
blockholders. It is expected that each of these
groups would exercise interest for the company to
produce the best financial results possible. For
example, debt holders expect a company to act in
ways that ensure the future repayment of the debt.
Management would seek to ensure continued
employment and maximization of stock-based
compensation. Blockholders would desire
maximum returns on investments and would act in
a manner to accomplish this objective. Hypotheses
tested are as follows:
H 3: There is a positive relationship behveen the debt
to equity ratio and incidence of restatement.
H 2 : There is a positive relationship between the
proportion of management ownership and the
incidence of restatement.
H 3 : There is a positive relationship behveen the
proportion of blockholder ownership and the
incidence of restatement.

H., There is a negative relationship between usc of a
Big 5accounting firm and the incidence of rL>statement.

Sample and Data Collection:
The sample used for analysis includes 30 companies that
were the object of an SEC Enforcement Action regarding financial
statements for the years 1999-2004. This information was
obtained from a search of the selected Accounting and Auditing
Enforcement Releases available on the SEC website. Each
release was analyzed to see that it did include a restatement of
quarterlyoryearlyfinancialstatements(lO-Qor IO-K). Releases
were also analyzed to determine the quarter or year in which
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restatement had the greatest effect on previously stated earnings.
This period of time was then matched with a control firm that had
not been the object of an Enforcement Action. Restatement and
non-restatement companies were matched on three criteria: 1.)
has the same North American Industrial Classification System
(NAICS) code; 2.) a similartype of business as discussed in the
"Business" section of each company's 10-K; 3.) the closest size
as measured by total assets for the period restated.
The Compustat North America Industrial Annual and
Quarterly databases were used to determine the total assets used
to match companies. The databases were also used to pull the
short-term debt, long-term debt, and total equity used to compose
the Debt to Equity ratio used in analysis.
The proportion of management ownership and the
proportion of blockholder ownership also used in analysis of
economic determinants were gathered from the Proxy statements
available on the SEC website. The Proxy for the period of
restatement was used to gain this information. If a manager was
also a blockholder, he or she was included in the management
percentage and not the blockholderpercentage. The blockholder
percentage only represents those blockholders that were not
included in the management percentage. This eliminates
redundancy among the data collected.
For usage in the descriptive statistics section, the auditor at
the period of restatement was also collected from the Proxy
statement. Also, the Enforcement Releases were analyzed to
determine common reasons for restatement which are displayed
in the descriptive statistics.

Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics of the sample of 30 restatement firms
and matches are presented in tables 1-4. Table 1 presents the
distribution of years represented by the restatements. In this
sample, an equal number (II) of restatements concerned the
years 2000 and 200 I. while fewer restatements concerned later
years. This represents the year affected by the restatement rather
than the year the restatement was released. Likely, the need for
r~statements of information in later years has not yet been
dtscovered or has not yet been the subject of an Enforcement
Action by the SEC.

Ta~Ie 2 represents the number of restatements by NAICS
code ~or tndustry. It shows that nine of the 30 restatements (30%)
~sed m the study came from the manufacturing industry. This
mcludes sub-industry names such as engines and turbines
pharmaceutical preparations. special industry machinery. electri~
computers. and prefab metal buildings. Companies include
Cummins. Inc.. Bristol-Myers Squibb Company, DT Industries,
Inc .. and NCI Building Systems, Inc. Also notable are the six
restatements from the information industry. This includes Time
Warner. Inc. from motion picture and video tape production,
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Gemstar-TV Guide International, Inc. from periodicals, and i2
Technologies, Inc. from prepackaged software.
Table 3 discloses the reasons for restatements found in the
Enforcement Action document on the SEC website.
Overwhelmingly, 12 of the 30 restatements (40%) involved
improperly recognized revenue. This follows previous findings
by a study sponsored by the FEI Research Foundation that also
found the most prevalent reasons for restatement was revenue
recognition followed by cost issues and loan Joss provisions. In
the sample used in this paper, cost issues (called improperly
recorded expenses) and loan Joss provisions (called treatment of
losses) are also dominant issues.
Table 4 reviews the auditor responsible for the period of
restatement for both the restatement firms and non-restatement
firms. PricewaterhouseCoopers audited an overall majority of
firms and a majority of the restatement firms also. Also notable,
Arthur Anderson audited the second most number of firms, as the
majority of time covered by the sample was before the firm was
disbanded. Ernst & Young was largely more likely to audit a
non-restatement firmratherthan a restatement firm, while "other"
firms were more likely to audit restatement firms. The""other"
category includes firms that were not in the Big 5, such as
regional and local firms. Even though these firms were more
likely to audit a restatement firm rather than a non-restatement
firm, most restatement firms had been audited by a Big 5 firm.

Results:

Univariate Statistics
Univariate statistics were used to examine the basic variation
between restatement and matched (control) companies. Although
these differences alone do not provide evidence to support
individual hypotheses, they do provide insight into the sample
used in this paper
Table 5 presents the overall mean of variables from all
causes of restatements and their matched companies. In this
sample of30 restatement companies and 30 matched companies,
matched companies exhibited a higher asset to equity ratio,
shown as 7.86 for matched companies and 4.46 for restatement
companies. This illustrates that companies experiencing a
restatement hold a lower amount of assets in relation to their
equity, providing a possible explanation of their behavior. Also
notable, restatement companies have a 2.6% higher percentage
of blockholder ownership than matched companies. This may
show that because restatement companies have ahigherproportion
of stock owned by these institutional shareholders, they may also
be susceptible to the pressures from these blockholders. Such a
type of owner would be more demanding than an individual
stockholder because of the concentrated n;ture of ownership.
Table 6 presents the mean of only the two most common
causes of restatement as previously discussed - improperly
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recognized revenue and improperly recorded expenses. Of the
firms that have improperly recognized revenue, restatement
companies have a higher asset to equity ratio than matched
companies. The mean of 2.24 for restatement firms is much
lower than the mean of 4.46 from all causes of restatement. Also,
assets to equity is higher for matched companies than restatement
companies when reviewing the overall mean. Companies with
improperly recognized revenues have a considerably higher
percentage of blockholder ownership, representing the same
situation as the overall mean of all restatements.
This ownership situation is negative when examining only
the means of restatement firms and matched firms for improperly
recorded expenses. For this situation, matched firms have a
higher proportion of blockholder ownership than restatement
firms. Restatement firms also have higher assets to equity,
current debt to equity, long term debt to equity, and total debt to
equity than matched companies. With the possible exception of
assets to equity, this would follow conventional knowledge that
the pressures of holding debt could lead to possible areas of
fraud, therefore restatements

Regression Analysis
The hypotheses were tested using two different regression
models. In each model, restatement versus matched firms was
used as the dependent variable, using a dichotomous indicator
variable of 1 to indicate a restatement firm or 0 to indicate a
matched firm. Other objective variables, such as Big 5 audit firm
in Modell and individual Big 5 firm or smaller SEC audit firms
in Model2, respectively, were measured by using a 1 to signify
use of the particular firm and a 0 to signify use of another firm.
Also, the Log of assets was used to eliminate any size bias
between firms with different levels of assets.

41

intercept and Big 5 audit firm results are significant at a 10%
level. The p-value of the Big 5 audit firm variable can be divided
in half to represent a one tailed test rather than a two tailed test.
This is applicable because the influence of an audit firm is
hypothesized to be positively related to fewer restatements, and
thus it is a one-tailed test.. In this case, it is that firms who use
a Big 5 audit firm would experience fewer restatements, as large
audit firms have been shown in previous studies to produce
higher quality audit results. In their I999 paper, Colbert and
Murray present several reasons why major audit firms would
produce a higher quality audit. These include taking advantage
of economies of scale, guarding reputation, and utilization of
human capital (Colbert and Murray, 1999).
The Big 5 audit firm variable is also significant because of
its representation of the overall population of public companies.
Firms who used an auditor other than a Big 5 firm received a "0"
value for the Big 5 variable, and the proportion of firms using a
non-Big 5 firm (I 0%) reflects the actual proportion of public
firms using non-Big 5 audit firms.
The regression of Model2 is also presented in Table 8. The
intercept and Ernst & Young both produced significant results.
At a 10% level in a one tailed test, firms audited by Ernst &
Young are less likely (negative coefficient of -0.50) to audit a
company that restated financial statements. This would follow
the regression analysis of Modell that found companies audited
by a Big 5 firm are less likely to produce a restatement.
The lack of overall significance in both models may be
attributed to the small sample size. It is possible that with a larger
sample size, results would be significant. However, an
examination of the coefficients (although not significant) may
provide some additional insight relative to the overall research
question- what are the factors that contribute to restatements?

The models are as follows:
Model 1
Restatement= a+ b 1(assets) + b2 (debt/assets)+ b 3
(debt/ equity)+ b 4 (%of management ownership)+ b 5
(% ofblockholder ownership)+ b 6 (Big 5 audit firm)
Model2
Restatement= a+ b 1(assets) + b 2 (debt/assets)+ b,
(debt/ equity)+ b 4 (%of management ownership)+ b 5
(%of blockholder ownership)+ b 6 (EY) + b 7 (Arthur
Anderson)+ b 8 (Deloitte) + b 9 (KPMG) + b 10 (PWC)
Table 7 illustrates the mean, median, standard deviation.
high and low values for each of the variables used in each modeL
It indicates the wide variation between the high and low values
for the particular variable and gives a relative idea of the
midpoint of the variable.
Table 8 presents the results of regression tests performed
using the two models presented above. Model 1 shows that the
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There is anecdotal information from the coefficients that
may help one to interpret how managers might engage in
mistatements of financial information. The most important
variables are the percentage of management and blockholder
ownership. In both models, negative coefficient of management
ownership indicates that with increased percentages of
management ownership, the probablity of restatement decreases.
A possible explanation of this is that management would likely
want to avoid restatement to protect the value of its ownership in
the company. A similar logical argument exists with the
percentage ofblockholders. Both regression models show that
increased blockholder ownership is positively related with the
probability of restatement. It is expected that blockholders
demand high returns and because of their concentration of
ownership, they would have more power than the average
shareholder. The debt to assets ratio is also useful. With a
positive coefficent of 0.1 and 0.11 in Model I and Model 2,
respectively, it shows that with an increase in the debt to assets
ratio, the probability of restatement increases. This is logical
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because as debt increases, companies face increased pressure to
produce positive financial performance to maintain credit and
market standing. The pressure may cause the company to follow
questionable accounting practices that could eventually lead to
a restatement when policies are found to be incorrect. This is
evidenced by positive coefficients of the debt to assets ratio. The
results of assets and debt to equity ratio variables, coefficients
of 0.02 and -0.01, respectively, produce a negligible impact on
the results of both models, minimizing their importance.

Supplemental Tables:
Table 1:

Years Represented
by Restatements
1999
5

2000
2001
2002
2003
2004

Conclusion:
Following the adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of2002,
the frequency of financial statement restatements has increased
because of the increased scrutiny on company internal control
practices. Previous literature has discussed the effects of
restatements on both the company and investors. It was found
that a company is likely to experience a decreased stock price
while investors may suffer from a loss in value of their investment.
This paper seeks to find the economic determinants of
restatements using a sample of 30 restatement firms derived
from companies that have received SEC Enforcement Actions.
These firms were matched by industry and asset size with 30
firms that had not restated financial statements. The sample was
tested using four hypotheses covering the areas of debt to equity
ratio, proportion of management ownership, proportion of
blockholder ownership, and the use of a Big 5 accounting firm
for auditing.
It was concluded that a negative relationship exists between
audit by a Big 5 accounting firm and the incidence of restatement.
Further. the use of Ernst & Young as an audit firm significantly
decreased the incidence of restatement in this sample. Results
for other hypotheses were not significant for this sample, possibly
due to the small sample size.
The results were consistent with previous studies that
found Big 5 firms, such as Ernst & Young, provided higher
quality audits than non Big 5 firms. Also, although not significant,
the negative coefficient of management ownership and the
positive relationship of blockholder ownership also provide
useful information. These groups both act in their own self
interest- that of protecting the value of investments and earning
higher returns, respectively. Further, the positive coefficient of
the debt to assets ratio highlights the pressures that debt can
cause for a company.
As Sarbanes Oxley proviSIOns continue to be fully
implemented. incidence of restatements will probably continue
to remain higher than that of previous years. This will continue
to affect both investors and the company itself, as restatements
can be the catalyst for a further sequence of effects, such as stock
price changes. credit rating revisions, and monetary fines.
Research from this paper shows that the use of audit services
from a Big 5 firm can mitigate these effects.
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11
11
2
0
1
30

N

Table2:

Industry
Utilities (22)
Construction (23)
Manufacturing (31-33)
Retail trade (44-45)
lnfonnation (51)
Finance and Insurance (52)
Real estate and rental and leasing {53)
Professional, scientific, and technical services {54)

1
1
9
3
6
5
2
3

--"30

Table 3:
Reason for Restatement
Improperly recognized re\enue
Improperly recorded expenses
Treatment of losses
Accounts receivable/payable
Improperly recorded gain on sale
Other
N

12
7
4
3
2
2
30

Table4:
Auditor

Restatement
co.
PWC
8
Arthur Anderson
6
4
EY
KPMG
5
Deloitte
3
4
Other
N
30

%
26.7%
20.0%

13.3%
16.7%
10.0%
13.3%

Match co.
7
7
7
3
4
2
30

Total
15
13
11
23.3%
8
10.0%
7
133%
6
6.7%
60
%

%

23.3%
23.3%

25.0%
21.7%
18.3%
13.3%
11.7%
10.0%

Source: Roxy slaterrent for peroo of restate<rent

Table 5:
Overall Mean of All Causes of Restatement

Assets to equity ratio
Current debt to equity ratio
Long term debt to equity ratio
Total debt to equity ratio
% of management ownership
% of b!ockholder ownership

Restatement

Matched Companies

4.46

7.86
0.58
3.02

0.26
1.22
1.48
17.2%
17.2%

3.61
19.5%
14.6%
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Table 6:
Mean of Most Common Causes of Restatement
Improperly
Recognized
Revenue

Improperly Recorded
Exeenses

Restatement

Match

Restaterrent

Match

2.24
0.05
0.48
0.53
12.9%
19.1%

2.02
0.04
0.67
0.70
16.3%
4.5%

7.09
0.29
2.99
3.29
21.4%
171%

3.25
0.16
0.33
0.49
41.0%
23.1%

Assets to equity ratio
Current debt to equity ratio
Long term debt to equity ratio
Total debt to equity ratio
% of management ownership
% of block holder ownership

Table 7:
Model 1
High
Varloble
Mean Median Std Dev
6
3
1.16
log Assets
3
0.18
0.40
2.06
Debt!Assets
0.33
72.19
9.46
DebUEquity
0.72
2.55
9.77% 23.21% 100.00%
% management ownership 18.37%
18.88% 99.50%
% block holder O'Nnership 15.90% 10.85%
1
1
0
Big 5 audit finn
1

Low

1
0.00
0.00
0.00%
O.OOOA.

0

Model 2
Variable

Mean

3
0.33
2.55
% management ownership 18.37%
% blockholder ownership 15.90%
EY
0
Mhur Anderson
0
Deloitte
0
KPMG
0
PWC
0
log Assets
Debt!Assets
Debt!Equity

0

Median Std Dev

3
0.18
0.72
9.77%
10.85%
0
0
0
0

High

5
1.07
0.40
2.06
72.19
9.46
23.21% 100.00%
18.88% 099.50%
0.39
0
0.42
0
0.32
0
0.34
0
0.44

Low

0.00
0.00
0.00%
0.00%

Regression Results
Coefficient P value

Model 1
0.74
0.02
0.1
-0.01
-0.16
0.2
-0.36

0.03
0.75
0.57
0.19
0.61
0.59
0.17
60

Mode/2
Intercept
Log Assets
DebUAssets
Debt/Equity
% management ownership

0.75
0.02
0.11
-0.01
-0.2

% blockholder ownership

0.22

EY
Arthur Anderson
Deloitte

-0.5
-0.39
-0.4
-0.19
0.31

KPMG
PWC
Number of observaticns

0.03
0.81
0.54
0.17
0.54
0.56
0.11
0.19
0.22
0.55
0.29
60
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Faculty comments:
Dr. Don Finn explains the importance of his student's work
in his letter of support for its publication. He said,

Table 8:

Intercept
Log Assets
Debt/Assets
Debt/Equity
% management ownership
% blockholder ownership
Big 5 audit firm
Number of obser.ations

43

Ms. Berman's paper investigates the economic
determinants of financial restatements that have been
mandated by the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEQ). Briefly, the SEC mandates that financial
statements be restated when they find anomalies
and/or errors (and possibly fraud) in the published
information. The paper focused only on companies
who have restated earnings and have been the target
of an Enforcement Action. 1l1e purpose of identifying
thesecompaniesisbecausetheymayhaveexperienced
fraudulentactions,ratherthanotherlessseriouscauses
of restatements. To discern whether an accounting
action is actually an economic determinant of
restatement, all restatement firms were matched (a
control group) with an equivalent non-restatement
firm. The potential economic determinants between
restatement and non-restatement companies were
measured using the leverage, proportion of
management ownership, and proportion of
blockholder ownership.
It was determined that those firms audited by Big 5
firms were less likely to produce a restatement. In a
second regression analysis, Ernst & Young was found
to be the Big 5 firm whose clients were least likely to
have a restatement. Thus, it was determined that
large public accounting firms who performed audits
were more reliable than those firms which are smaller
and may not have the resources to properly audit
large public companies.
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